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1980] SURVEY OF NEW YORK PRACTICE
may be adduced, should be irrelevant to the viability of the cause
of action. Thus, it is submitted, as between cohabiting parties,
Morone should not be read to preclude the assertion of a cause of
action in implied-in-fact contract to recover for personal services
rendered. 2 4
Joseph J. Tesoriero
Evidence of prior uncharged criminal acts admissible to rebut de-
fendant's claim of legal insanity
In order to reduce the possibility that a defendant in a crimi-
nal prosecution will be convicted on the basis of his criminal pro-
pensity, evidence of prior uncharged criminal acts generally is ex-
cluded.125 Nevertheless, in limited circumstances, the prosecutor
may introduce evidence of the defendant's prior criminal acts pro-
vided that the evidence is relevant 26 to a material issue in the
124 In Levar v. Elkins, 604 P.2d 602 (Alaska 1980), the Supreme Court of Alaska af-
firmed the trial court's denial of a motion to dismiss the plaintiff's case against her former
live-in partner based on an express or implied-in-fact agreement. Id. at 603. On appeal, the
court remarked that since the woman had abandoned her claim in quantum meruit at trial
and relied only upon an express or implied contractual theory of recovery, there would be no
need to address the "questions" raised by Marvin v. Marvin, 18 Cal. 3d 660, 557 P.2d 106,
134 Cal. Rptr. 815 (1976). Levar v. Elkins, 604 P.2d at 603 & n.2. It is submitted that the
tacit refusal by the court to distinguish between express and implied-in-fact agreements,
notwithstanding that the parties to the agreement were cohabitants, evinces the recognition
that the fact of cohabitation should not preclude the application of general principles of
contract law. See generally Adams & Co. Real Estate v. E. & B. Super Markets, Inc., 26
App. Div. 2d 365, 366, 274 N.I.S.2d 776, 778 (1st Dep't 1966); Note, Property Rights of
Nonmarital Partners in Meretricious Cohabitation, 13 NEw ENGLAND L. Rv. 453, 472
(1978).
12' The general rule excluding from the trier of fact evidence of prior criminal acts of
the defendant is based on the recognition that
[t]he deep tendency of human nature to punish, not because our victim is guilty
this time, but because he is a bad man and may as well be condemned now that he
is caught, is a tendency which cannot fail to operate with any jury, in or out of
Court.
J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 57, at 456 (Chadbourn rev. ed. 1970). This "exclusionary rule" is
"universally recognized" and "firmly established." People v. Molineux, 168 N.Y. 264, 191-93,
61 N.E. 286, 293-94 (1901); see, e.g., People v. Allweiss, 48 N.Y.2d 40, 46, 396 N.E.2d 735,
738, 421 N.Y.S.2d 341, 344 (1979); People v. Fiore, 34 N.Y.2d 81, 84, 312 N.E.2d 174, 176,
356 N.Y.S.2d 38, 41 (1974); People v. Dales, 309 N.Y. 97, 101, 127 N.E.2d 829, 830-31 (1955);
People v. Shea, 147 N.Y. 78, 99, 41 N.E. 505, 511 (1895); People v. Sharp, 107 N.Y. 427, 460,
14 N.E. 319, 340 (1887); Coleman v. People 55 N.Y. 81, 90 (1873).
126 The relevancy of evidence has been described as "the tendency of the evidence to
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case. 127 Where the insanity defense is raised,128 however, the extent
to which the prosecutor may introduce prior uncharged criminal
acts to rebut the defense has been unclear.129 Recently, in People
establish a material proposition." C. McCoRMICK, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF EVIDENCE §
185, at 435 (2d ed. 1972) (footnote omitted). The most common test of relevancy is whether
the evidence offered renders the truth of the fact sought to be proved more probable than it
would have been without the evidence. Id. at 437-38. Thus, evidence which advances the
factfinding process and has probative value is prima facie admissible. Id. Even relevant evi-
dence, however, may be excluded in certain circumstances. Id. at 438-40.
127 People v. Molineux, 168 N.Y. 264, 61 N.E. 286 (1901). The Molineux Court author-
ized the use of evidence of prior criminal, immoral or vicious acts to impeach a defendant's
testimony, despite its potentially prejudicial effect:
[G]enerally speaking, evidence of other crimes is competent to prove the specific
crime charged when it tends to establish (1) motive; (2) intent; (3) the absence of
mistake or accident; (4) a common scheme or plan embracing the commission of
two or more crimes so related to each other that proof of one tends to establish
the others; (5) the identity of the person charged with the commission of the
crime on trial.
Id. at 293, 61 N.E. at 294 (citation omitted). The Molineux "exceptions" are essentially
tests of relevance to be applied to particular pieces of proffered evidence in the distinctive
factual situations in which their use is necessary either to obtain or sustain a conviction.
Subsequent to Molineux, the Court recognized additional exceptions to admit evidence of
prior uncharged criminal acts in cases where the defendant asserts the defense of alibi, Peo-
ple v. Thau, 219 N.Y. 39, 113 N.E. 556 (1916), or entrapment, People v. Calvano, 30 N.Y.2d
199, 282 N.E.2d 322, 331 N.Y.S.2d 430 (1972), or where relevant to prove that the defendant
and a companion were "acting in concert," People v. Jackson, 39 N.Y.2d 64, 346 N.E.2d 537,
382 N.Y.S.2d 736 (1976).
128 A defendant may avoid criminal responsibility for even admitted acts by satisfying
the mental disease or defect test codified in the New York Penal Law. Section 30.05 of the
Penal Law provides, in part-
(1) A person is not criminally responsible for conduct if at the time of such con-
duct, as a result of mental disease or defect, he lacks substantial capacity to know
or appreciate either:
(a) The nature and consequences of such conduct; or
(b) That such conduct was wrong ....
N.Y. PENAL LAw § 30.05 (McKinney 1975).
In New York, the presumption that a defendant is sane is "rationally based on a fact of
common experience that most men are sane." People v. Silver, 33 N.Y.2d 475, 480-81, 310
N.E.2d 520, 523, 354 N.Y.S.2d 915, 920 (1974). In order to rebut the presumption and put
his sanity in issue, New York requires the defendant to offer a quantum of proof less than
substantial and more than a mere scintilla of proof. Id. at 481, 310 N.E.2d at 523-24, 354
N.Y.S.2d at 920-21; Brotherton v. People, 75 N.Y. 159, 162-63 (1878). Once the defense has
been asserted, however, the People are required to prove a defendant sane beyond a reason-
able doubt. See N.Y. PENAL LAW § 25.00(1) (McKinney 1975). See generally Corbett, The
Defense of Insanity, 29 BROOKLYN B. 99 (1978); Fingarette, Disabilities of Mind and Crimi-
nal Responsibility-A Unitary Doctrine, 76 COLUM. L. REV. 236 (1976); Hellenbrand,
Mental Issues in Criminal Trials, 31 BROOKLYN B. 6 (1979).
'29 Compare People v. Molineux, 168 N.Y. 264, 293, 61 N.E. 286, 294 (1901) with Peo-
ple v. Carlin, 194 N.Y. 448, 452, 87 N.E. 805, 807 (1909). Other jurisdictions which have
considered the question have held that the events from the entire life of a defendant are
admissible as relevant for determining sanity at the time of the commission of the crime
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v. Santarelli,5 ° the Court of Appeals held that the scope of the
evidence admissible on the prosecutor's rebuttal was limited to
that which bore directly on the People's theory of sanity and which
had a natural tendency to refute the defendant's specific theory of
legal insanity. 31
Defendant Santarelli admitted killing his brother-in-law with
a sawed-off shotgun, but interposed the defense of legal insanity. 32
On his direct case, the defendant introduced lay and expert testi-
mony that at the time of the incident he was suffering from a para-
noid delusion intensified by the influence of amphetamines and,
hence, was legally insane.1 3 On rebuttal, the People introduced ev-
idence of prior uncharged criminal conduct by Santarelli to show
that at the time of the slaying he was suffering from a personality
disorder not rising to the level of legal insanity.'" Counsel for the
charged. See State v. Rawland, 294 Minn. 17, 199 N.W.2d 774 (1972); McLeod v. State, 317
So.2d 389 (Miss. 1975); Mears v. State, 83 Nev. 3, 422 P.2d 230 (1967); State v. Huson, 73
Wash.2d 660, 440 P.2d 192 (1968). But see Watts v. State, 282 Ala. 245, 210 So.2d 805
(1968). Notably, Professor Wigmore favors the broad admissibility of "any and all conduct"
of the defendant to rebut the insanity defense since "if a specific act does not indicate
insanity it may indicate sanity." J. WIGMOOP, supra note 125 § 228, at 9 (emphasis in
original).
1 3 49 N.Y.2d 241, 401 N.E.2d 199, 425 N.Y.S.2d 77 (1980), rev'g, 64 App. Div. 2d 803,
407 N.Y.S.2d 744 (3d Dep't 1978) (mem.).
231 49 N.Y.2d at 248, 401 N.E.2d at 204, 425 N.Y.S.2d at 82.
132 Id. at 244, 401 N.E.2d at 201, 425 N.Y.S.2d at 79. Apprehended shortly after the
killing, Santarelli acknowledged responsibility for his brother-in-law's death. Id.
'- Id. at 245-46, 401 N.E.2d at 202, 425 N.Y.S.2d at 80. Lay witnesses, including the
defendant's wife, testified to the defendant's nervous and distracted behavior in the days
prior to the shooting. Id. Defendant's expert witnesses testified that Santarelli was in a
psychotic state and legally insane within the meaning of the Penal Law at the time of the
killing. Id. at 246, 401 N.E.2d at 202, 425 N.Y.S.2d at 80; see N.Y. PENAL LAW § 30.05
(McKinney 1975).
134 On cross-examination, the defendant's expert witnesses had agreed that an individ-
ual suffering from the personality disorder of an "explosive personality" might also behave
in a manner similar to defendant Santarelli and be deemed legally sane. 49 N.Y.2d at 246,
401 N.E.2d at 202, 425 N.Y.S.2d at 80. Moreover, the witnesses had acknowledged that one
suffering from an explosive personality would "probably have a history of violent, antisocial
conduct and would have a tendency to react with disproportionate violence in the face of
relatively mild provocation." Id. Hence, over objection, the prosecutor sought to demon-
strate that the defendant fit such description by eliciting testimony from a witness who had
seen the defendant participate in a barroom scuffle, a police officer who had seen the defen-
dant throwing bottles around the barroom, a friend of the defendant who had been his
accomplice to a premeditated assault, and the defendant's probation officer who stated that
the defendant had been convicted of possession of a sawed-off shotgun. Id..at 250-52, 401
N.E.2d at 205-06, 425 N.Y.S.2d at 83-84. In addition, Santarelli's probation officer testified
to incidents where the defendant reacted violently in the face of mild provocation. Id. at
252, 401 N.E.2d at 206, 425 N.Y.S.2d at 84. Evidence of the defendant's association with
organized crime, introduced for the purpose of demonstrating that the defendant had been
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defense argued that this evidence was not relevant to any material
element of the People's case and that it was highly prejudicial to
the defendant because it tended only to demonstrate the defen-
dant's propensity to commit violent crimes.135 The trial court, nev-
ertheless, admitted the evidence over the "continuing objection"13
of the defense and, ultimately, Santarelli was convicted of murder
in the second degree. 3 7 The Appellate Division, Third Depart-
ment, affirmed the conviction,3 ' holding that the introduction of
evidence of uncharged criminal acts was proper since once the de-
fense of insanity is raised, "any and all prior conduct of the ac-
cused having a bearing on the subject is admissible, even though it
might also tend to show him guilty of other crimes." 3s
On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed the conviction. '0
Writing for the majority,141 Judge Gabrielli noted that while the
People may introduce evidence of prior criminal conduct probative
of the defendant's sanity once that issue is raised, the evidence
must nevertheless meet the test of "relevancy. 1 42 Maintaining that
there exists no pre-ordained formula for ascertaining the relevancy
of a particular uncharged criminal act, 43 the Santarelli Court reit-
erated the balancing test it enunciated in People v. Molineux,1 "
requiring that the proffered evidence not only "[bear] some ar-
ticulable relation to the issue" of the case, but also "that its proba-
tive value in fact warrants its admission despite the potential for
subjected to considerable emotional stress, also was admitted. Id. at 252-53, 401 N.E.2d at
206, 425 N.Y.S.2d at 84-85.
13 Id. at 246-47, 401 N.E.2d at 202, 425 N.Y.S.2d at 80-81.
1 Id. at 247, 401 N.E.2d at 202, 425 N.Y.S.2d at 81. A continuing objection is granted
by a trial court to eliminate the constant repetition of objections and is deemed desirable
because, while preserving objections for appellate review, it allows a trial to progress without
interruption. United States v. Hall, 348 F.2d 837, 843 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 947
(1965).
1- 49 N.Y.2d at 247, 401 N.E.2d at 202, 425 N.Y.S.2d at 81.
13 64 App. Div. 2d 803, 407 N.Y.S.2d 744 (3d Dep't 1978) (mem.).
13, Id. at 804, 407 N.Y.S.2d at 746 (citations omitted). The appellate division further
stated that the admitted evidence "carried little potential for prejudice ... since the cen-
tral issue was one of criminal responsibility, not credibility or propensity to commit crime."
Id.
140 49 N.Y.2d at 247, 401 N.E.2d at 203, 425 N.Y.S.2d at 81.
11 Chief Judge Cooke and Judges Jones, Wachtler, Fuchsberg and Meyer joined with
Judge Gabrielli. Judge Jasen dissented in a separate opinion.
142 49 N.Y.2d at 247, 401 N.E.2d at 203, 425 N.Y.S.2d at 81. See generally note 126
supra.
43 49 N.Y.2d at 248, 401 N.E.2d at 203, 425 N.Y.S.2d at 81.
144 168 N.Y. 264, 61 N.E. 286 (1901); see note 127 supra.
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prejudice. ' 145 Analogizing an insanity defense to the affirmative de-
fense of entrapment, the Court posited that just as the accused
places his predisposition to commit the crime in issue when en-
trapment is asserted, so too, a defendant asserting the defense of
1146insanity places facets of his character and past history in issue.
Nevertheless, while a defendant's interposition of an insanity de-
fense "opens the door" to the People's "character evidence," the
scope of admissible evidence, according to the Court, is limited by
a two-tiered test.1 47 Only that evidence which has a "natural ten-
dency to disprove [the defendant's] specific claim" of legal in-
sanity148 and which has a "direct bearing" on the People's theory
of the defendant's sanity1 49 is deemed relevant and admissible. Ap-
plying this test, the majority concluded that since the trial judge
had failed to evaluate each piece of evidence with sufficient partic-
ularity to ensure its "relevancy," a reversal of this conviction was
required 1 5 0
145 49 N.Y.2d at 250, 401 N.E.2d at 204, 425 N.Y.S.2d at 83.
, Id. at 248, 401 N.E.2d at 203, 425 N.Y.S.2d at 81-82.
'7 Id. at 249, 401 N.E.2d at 204, 425 N.Y.S.2d at 82.
148 Id. The Court emphasized that interposition of an insanity defense does not auto-
matically place the defendant's "entire character" in issue. Id. The Court distinguished the
case of People v. Carlin, 194 N.Y. 448, 87 N.E. 805 (1909), in which it was stated that "[tihe
whole previous career of a man, in its general aspects at least, may throw some light on [a
defendant's] mental condition at the time when he is alleged to have committed a criminal
offense, and when insanity is relied upon as a defense in his behalf." Id. at 452, 87 N.E. at
807 (dicta). This statement, the Santarelli majority noted, referred only to the scope of
evidence the defendant can use to rebut the presumption of sanity and not to that which
the People can use to prove the defendant sane. 49 N.Y.2d at 250 n.3, 401 N.E.2d at 205 n.3,
425 N.Y.S.2d at 83 n.3.
149 49 N.Y.2d at 249, 401 N.E.2d at 204, 425 N.Y.S.2d at 82.
10 Id. The majority examined each piece of proffered evidence, see note 134 supra, to
determine if each was material and relevant to the People's theory of "explosive personal-
ity." 49 N.Y.2d at 249, 401 N.E.2d at 204, 425 N.Y.S.2d at 83. In the majority's view, evi-
dence of a defendant's participation in a barroom scuffle did not indicate a tendency to
react violently without adequate provocation absent testimony as to how the incident began
and, hence, should not have been admitted. Id. at 250-51, 401 N.E.2d at 205, 425 N.Y.S.2d
at 83. Similarly, the Court stated, testimony by the defendant's accomplice to a premedi-
tated assault and testimony to the defendant's prior conviction for possession of a sawed-off
shotgun should have been excluded on the ground that such did not support the People's
theory that the defendant was impulsively violent. Id. at 250-52, 401 N.E.2d at 205-06, 425
N.Y.S.2d at 84. Testimony to incidents where the defendant had reacted violently when
mildly provoked, on the other hand, were deemed competent and properly admitted, as was
testimony to the defendant's organized crime activities. Id. at 252-53, 401 N.E.2d at 206, 425
N.Y.S.2d at 84-85.
Although commending the trial judge for conducting an advance hearing to determine
the nature and relevance of the People's rebuttal proof and for giving limiting instructions
to the jury concerning the use of the evidence that was admitted, id. at 253-54, 401 N.E.2d
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In a vigorous dissent, Judge Jasen stated that all acts in a de-
fendant's prior career should be admissible provided that "such ev-
idence is material and relevant to the issue of defendant's sanity at
the time of the offense and [that] it would be helpful to the jury in
evaluating the defense of insanity." '51 Permitting a broad range of
evidence of a defendant's prior acts, he argued, would not enhance
the risk of convictions based on the defendant's criminal propen-
sity where, as here, the defendant's commission of the crime al-
ready had been resolved by the defendant's admission. 52 At the
same time, opening the defendant's entire past life to scrutiny aids
the People in satisfying the heavy burden of proving the defendant
sane beyond a reasonable doubt.115 Judge Jasen opined that the
majority had "overemphasize[d] the possibility of prejudice to the
defendant" and "withheld from the jury logically probative and
clearly relevant proof of defendant's sanity" by restrictively de-
lineating the scope of evidence of prior crimes and antisocial con-
duct which may be offered to prove a defendant's sanity.1" In so
doing, the dissenting judge concluded, the majority had unduly re-
stricted the People to one theory of sanity, and unnecessarily in-
creased the People's heavy burden of proving the defendant sane
beyond a reasonable doubt.155
In limiting the extent to which prior criminal acts of a defen-
dant are admissible to rebut the insanity defense, the Santarelli
Court foreclosed the People from launching an unbridled attack
upon a defendant's past character. Indeed, the Court implicitly
recognized that the unrestricted use of prior criminal acts would
discourage defendants from pleading insanity for fear that they
at 206-07, 425 N.Y.S.2d at 85, the Santarelli Court disapproved of the use of a continuing
objection since the trial judge was not given an opportunity to discern the relevance of each
item of testimonial evidence proffered. Id. at 253, 401 N.E.2d at 207, 425 N.Y.S.2d at 85.
The Court instead suggested that individual objections may have moved the trial judge to
"require the prosecutor to articulate his theory of relevancy with more specificity" and may
have avoided the defects in the trial Id.
151 49 N.Y.2d at 255, 401 N.E.2d at 208, 425 N.Y.S.2d at 86 (Jasen, J., dissenting).
12 Id. at 254-55, 401 N.E.2d at 207-08, 425 N.Y.S.2d at 86 (Jasen, J., dissenting). Echo-
ing the view of the appellate division, see note 139 supra, Judge Jasen contended that no
risk of prejudice to the defendant exists when the fact of the crime's commission is undis-
puted and the admitted evidence merely affects the issue of criminal responsibility. In such
cases, the dissenting judge maintained, the restrictive rule of Molineux was inapplicable. 49
N.Y.2d at 255, 401 N.E.2d at 207-08, 425 N.Y.S.2d at 86 (Jasen, J., dissenting).
13 49 N.Y.2d at 254, 401 N.E.2d at 207, 425 N.Y.S.2d at 86 (Jasen, J., dissenting).
Id. at 254, 401 N.E.2d at 207, 425 N.Y.S.2d at 86 (Jasen, J., dissenting).
1 Id. at 256-57, 401 N.E.2d at 208-09, 425 N.Y.S.2d at 87 (Jasen, J., dissenting).
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may be confronted with every alleged criminal act of their past
lives. 156 Nevertheless, by using the prosecutor's theory of sanity as
a benchmark for determining the relevance and, hence, the admis-
sibility of prior criminal acts, 157 the Court inadvertently may have
undermined the salutary effect of its holding.15 8 It is submitted
that in the wake of Santarelli, prosecutors will no longer empha-
size one discrete theory of the defendant's sanity, for fear that evi-
dence of prior crimes lacking a "direct bearing" on that particular
theory would be excluded. Hence, as prosecutors tend toward more
general rebuttal theories, the range of admissible evidence conceiv-
ably may approach "the whole previous career of a man," in dero-
gation of the tenor of Santareli.1 59 Despite the Court's cautious
approach to admissibility, the possibility exists that evidence bear-
ing upon a defendant's criminal propensity may be revealed to the
jury under the guise of relevancy to an overly broad theory of san-
ity.160 To avoid this result, it is submitted that specific procedures
I- Id. at 250, 401 N.E.2d at 204-05, 425 N.Y.S.2d at 83. An analogous situation was
presented in People v. Sandoval, 34 N.Y.2d 371, 314 N.E.2d 413, 357 N.Y.S.2d 849 (1974).
In Sandoval, the Court limited the use of prior crime to impeach a defendant-witness on
cross-examination. The Court reasoned that a contrary rule might lead defendants to avoid
testifying in their own behalf for fear of being confronted with all prior criminal or immoral
acts that they had allegedly committed. Id. at 375, 314 N.E.2d at 416, 357 N.Y.S.2d at 853-
54. See generally note 160 infra.
157 See 49 N.Y.2d at 248-49, 401 N.E.2d at 204, 425 N.Y.S.2d at 82. Had the prosecu-
tion relied on a less specific insanity defense, the Court suggested, the scope of admissible
evidence would have been wider. Id. at 249 n.2, 401 N.E.2d at 204 n.2, 425 N.Y.S.2d at 83
n.2.
In It is submitted that in light of Santarelli, prosecutors will be encouraged to rebut an
insanity defense by relying on a compilation-of-factors approach rather than on one discrete
theory, see generally People v. Reade, 1 N.Y.2d 459, 136 N.E.2d 497, 154 N.Y.S.2d 27
(1956); People v. Rentz, 57 App. Div. 2d 640, 393 N.Y.S.2d 456 (3d Dep't 1977) (mem.), thus
rendering the second tier of the Santarelli relevance test of little practical significance.
15 See note 148 supra.
260 Notably, it has been established in studies on jury behavior that the admission of
evidence of prior convictions substantially diminishes a defendant's chances for acquittal.
H. KALvEN & H. ZISEL, THE AmnscA&i JuRY 160-61 (1966); see Comment, Prior Conviction
Evidence and Defendant Witnesses, 53 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1290, 1301-12 (1978); Comment,
State v. Protash-Threatening Impeachment and Influencing Defendant's Decision to Tes-
tify: Prohibited Use of Compelled Testimony, 31 RUTGERs L. REv. 815, 823-24 (1978). See
generally Note, Constitutional Problems Inherent in the Admissibility of Prior Record
Conviction Evidence for the Purpose of Impeaching the Credibility of the Defendant Wit-
ness, 37 U. CINN. L. REv. 168 (1968). It is submitted that admission of evidence of prior
criminal, vicious and immoral acts similarly would reduce a defendant's chances for acquit-
tal on the basis of legal insanity at the time of the commission of the alleged crime. In light
of this possibility, it may be presumed that a defendant will be deterred from pleading
insanity to avoid "opening the door" to rebuttal evidence consisting of prior vicious, crimi-
nal or immoral acts.
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and guidelines must be enunciated so as to aid trial courts in mak-
ing consistent evidentiary determinations regarding the admissibil-
ity of prior criminal acts.16' In this way, notwithstanding the asser-
tion of an insanity defense, a defendant's right to a fair trial and
an impartial jury may be preserved without unduly impinging the
prosecutor's efforts to establish the sanity of the defendant.
Annette L. Guarino
Speaking to an analogous situation, in hearings regarding the adoption of Rule 609 of
the Federal Rules of Evidence, one legislator expressed concern about the effect the use of
prior convictions for impeachment purposes would have on a defendant's decision to testify
on his own behalf:
[A] very large proportion of the miscarriages of justice which occur are in those
cases where either we prejudice the man because he does take the witness stand in
his own defense, or we scare him off and he does not tell his story because of that
rule.
120 CONG. REC. 1419 (1974) (remarks of Rep. Dennis); see Note, Impeachment by Prior
Conviction: Adjusting to Federal Rule of Evidence 609, 64 CORNELL L. REV. 416, 419 (1979);
Note, Other Crimes Evidence at Trial: Of Balancing and Other Matters, 70 YALE L. J. 763,
778 (1961); Comment, Prior Conviction Evidence and Defendant Witnesses, 53 N.Y.U. L.
REv. 1290, 1309-12 (1978). But see 120 CONG. REC. 1414 (1974) (remarks of Rep. Hogan).
Notably, these concerns led to the adoption of Rule 609, which strictly limits the prosecu-
tor's ability to introduce evidence of prior convictons for impeachment purposes. See FED.
R. EVID. 609.
261 It is submitted that a pretrial hearing would be beneficial for evaluating specific
items of prior criminal conduct. Indeed, in connection with criminal prosecutions pretrial
hearings frequently have been dictated by courts in circumstances where precious constitu-
tional rights may be implicated. See, e.g., Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966); Mapp v.
Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961); People v. Huntley, 15 N.Y.2d 72, 204 N.E.2d 179, 255 N.Y.S.2d
838 (1965). Factors to be considered at a proposed "Santarelli hearing" to evaluate the
admissibility of a defendant's prior acts might include lapse of time between commission of
the prior act and the crime charged, age of the defendant at the time of the prior act, the
act's tendency to rebut the insanity defense as defined in section 30.05 of the Penal Law,
and its tendency to establish a character trait inconsistent with defendant's specific claim of
insanity. See People v. Sandoval, 34 N.Y.2d 371, 314 N.E.2d 413, 357 N.Y.S.2d 849 (1974).
In Sandoval, the Court of Appeals gave more specific guidelines for the evaluation of the
admissibility of evidence than it did in Santarelli. See id. at 376-78, 314 N.E.2d at 417-18,
357 N.Y.S.2d at 855-56. It is suggested that the specificity provided by the Court in Sando-
val has eased the operation of what was essentially a novel judicial rule. But see Note, The
Dilemma of a Defendant Witness in New York: The Impeachment Problem Half-Solved,
50 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 129, 150-51 (1975). It is therefore unfortunate that the Santarelli
Court did not address the practical problems faced by the trial judge in examining each
piece of proffered evidence with "sufficient particularity" to ensure its relevance to the de-
fendant's claim of insanity. 49 N.Y.2d at 249, 401 N.E.2d at 204, 425 N.Y.S.2d at 82.
